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Drone Privacy and the Need for Oversight
Ben Jenkins'
"The question we confront today is what limits are upon this power of
technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy."
-Kyllo v. United States
INTRODUCTION
T o those who enjoy the popular war simulation video game franchise 
Call
f Duty, the phrase "our UAV is online" is a thing of beauty.2 They signal
that the locations of all enemy combatants are now conveniently showcased
on an in-game map.3 To protect themselves from being seen, the enemy must
deploy a UAV jammer to scramble the electronics of the drone. 4 But drones are
not just fun and games: to privacy enthusiasts, the idea of these words used in
connection with domestic drone use might be harrowing. Citizens lack UAV
jammers, and currently the Constitution is their only protection from the
government's all-seeing eye.
Drones are rarely used in U.S. airspace today; however, as a result of a recent
congressional push, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has predicted
that 30,000 drones could be flying in U.S. skies in less than twenty years.s
Coupled with cutting-edge technology such as thermal imaging devices, high-
powered cameras, and facial recognition technology, current law may not be
prepared to adapt fast enough to address the privacy concerns raised by mass
domestic drone usage. Some action should be taken to protect citizens' privacy;
however, in doing so, care must be taken to not smother a kindling industry
i J.D. expected May 2014, University of Kentucky College of Law.
2 See Our UAVis Online, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?
term=OUR+UAV+IS+ONLINE&defid=3246 52q (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
3 See id.
4 Jammers interrupt communication systems so that the information being transmitted is
indiscernible; the effect is similar to turning up your radio louder than everyone else's so they can-
not hear their own radios. UAVJammer, CALL OF DUTY WIKI, http://callofduty.wikia.com/wiki/
UAVJammer (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
5 FED. AvIATION ADmIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS 2010-2030, at 48 (200),




that could bring great technological advancement and economic growth to
America's economy. The industry "hopes that there will be 100,000 people with
drone-related jobs by 2025,"6 and envisions a world in which parents will soon
be able to slap a high-tech sticker on their child's soccer ball that will allow a
drone to follow and record the action of the game in high quality video.'
This note argues that in order to safeguard Americans' privacy against
government drone surveillance in an actively growing field, Congress should
implement legislation that provides a framework for protection while allowing
for industry growth and innovation. Although several bills are pending, it is
uncertain if or when those bills will pass. While it would be a large step towards
ensuring privacy protection from drone surveillance if the proposed bills pass,
there is still room for improvement. Even the most promising bill, the Drone
Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013 (DAPTA), fails to provide
a process for ongoing oversight of drone operators to ensure transparency
and continued compliance with the Act's privacy protections. DAPTA and
other pending legislation should be amended to charge a single agency with
responsibility for drone privacy oversight, including audits to make sure drone
operators comply with privacy regulations. Operators should be required
to submit ongoing reports of their data collection, retention, and disposal
procedures to the agency, and these reports should be gathered and submitted
to Congress annually.
Proper legislative action would ensure that the constitutional right to privacy
is not overrun by rapidly growing technologies, diminishing privacy norms,
and heightened security interests. With proper privacy protections in place,
society could be more receptive to increased use, development, and application
of drones in daily life. Part I of this Note provides background on drones: their
nature, use, technology, and the current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
relevant to such. Part II explains why drones present a unique threat to privacy
and addresses current shortfalls in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and in
legislative efforts to address privacy concerns connected with their widespread
use. Part III suggests amendments to proposed legislation to address shortfalls
therein, concluding that proper anticipatory action and ongoing oversight
are necessary to ensure that police technology does not erode the minimum
expectations of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.'
6 Victor Luckerson, Where Will the DroneJobs Go? States Balance Economic Opportunity with
Privacy Concerns, TIME (May 1, 2013), http://business.time.coM/2o 3/05/oi/where-will-the-drone-
jobs-go-states-balance-economic-opportunity-with-privacy-concerns/.
7 Chris Anderson, Why We Shouldn't Fear Personal Drones, TIME (Jan. 3, 2013), http://ideas.
time.com/2oi 3/oi/31/why-we-shouldnt-fear-personal-drones/; Luckerson, supra note 5.
8 Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 2868, ii3th Cong. (2013).
9 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,34 (2001).
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I. OVERVIEW: A SNAPSHOT OF DRONES AND THEIR LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. Defining Drones
1. Nature.-Drones, also known as unmanned aerial vehicles, are aircrafts
"operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or
on the aircraft.""o Drones can range in size from a traditional jet" to an insect.12
Although current drones have maximum flight times of up to two days,"
emerging technology could increase flight times indefinitely.14
2. Uses.-Drones have been used internationally in military surveillance
and counterterrorism operations in Iraq, Afganistan, Pakistan and Yemen.s
Domestically, UAV technology has been used in border control," search and
rescue missions,'7 and surveillance during police standoffs." In response to the
recent push to integrate drones in the national airspace system, drone use and
application is expected to skyrocket in the near future to include surveilling
real estate developments," detecting and surveilling forest fires, 20 monitoring
so FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, §331(8), 126 Stat. II, 72.
n For example, Northrup Grumman's RQ- 4A Global Hawk has a n6-foot wingspan. Flight
of the Drones: Why the Future ofAir Power Belongs to Unmanned Systems, EcoNoMisT, Oct. 8, 2011,
available at http://economist.com/node/253I433.
12 US Military Surveillance Future: Drones Now Come in Swarms?, RT (June 20, 2012, 7:47
PM), http://rt.com/news/us-drones-swarms-z74/. The smallest commercial drones currently cost
as little as s300. ParrotAR.Drone 2.0 Quadricopter, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Parrot-AR-
Drone-Quadricopter-Controlled-Android/dp/Boo7HZLLOK (last visited Oct 19, 2013).
13 See David Axe, Upgrades to Killer Drone Could Make it Fly for Two Days Straight, WIRED
(Apr. 19, 201Z, 2:09 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/04/killer-drone-upgrade/.
14 Richard Whittle, How it Works: Laser Beaming Recharges UAV in Flight, POPULAR ME-
CHANIcS (July 28, 2012), http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/aviation/news/how-it-
works-laser-beaming-recharges-uav-in-flight-no9II33.
15 Peter Finn, Rise of the Drone: From Calf Garage to Multibillion-dollar Defense Industry,
THE WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 23, 2011, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2on-12-23/
national/35287608 -imini-drones-engineer-military-doctrine.
16 Drones have been used at the border to prevent terrorism, drug and weapons trading,
and illegal immigration. See CHAD C. HADDAL & JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS2169 8, HOMELAND SECURITY: UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND BORDER SURVEILLANCE 6
(2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RS2zi698.pdf
17 Charlie Ban, Drones Assist County Sheriffs'Search and Rescue Missions, NACO.ORG (May 21,
2012), http://www.naco.org/newsroom/countynews/Current%2olssue/-2I-20I2/Pages/Dronesassi
stcountysheriffs%Ez%80%99searchandrescuemissions.aspx.
18 Jason Koebler, Court Upholds Domestic Drone Use in Arrest ofAmerican Citizen, U.S. NEWS
AND WORLD REPORT (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2o2/o8/o2/court-up-
holds-domestic-drone-use-in-arrest-of-american-citizen.
19 Troy Roberts, On the Radar: Government UnmannedAerial Vehicles and Their Effect on Public
Privacy Interests from Fourth Amendment furisprudence and Legislative Policy Perspectives, 49 JURI-
METRICS J. 491,492 (2009).
20 Brian Skoloff & Tracie Cone, Predator Drone Now Part of Calf Wildfire Battle, ABC
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hostage situations,21 observing livestock and oil pipelines,22 and even tracking
FedEx package delivery.23
3. Technology.-Currently, drones can be outfitted with high-powered cameras,24
thermal imaging devices,25 and license plate readers.26 In the near future, law
enforcement organizations might seek to outfit drones with facial recognition
capabilities, which can recognize and track individuals based on height, weight,
age, gender, and skin color.27 The sophistication of drone technology might
influence a court's decision on whether domestic drone use is lawful under the
Fourth Amendment. This is a question that remains largely unanswered by
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, suggesting the need for legislative
action to ensure privacy protection from government searches.
B. Current FourthAmendmentJurisprudence
Modern day Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has evolved as the Supreme
Court has interpreted the Constitution in light of emerging technologies. But
the law has struggled to keep up with technology's rapid growth, leaving many
questions unanswered concerning the applicability of Fourth Amendment
protections to government drone surveillance.
NEWS (Aug. 28, 2053), http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/calif-launches-drone-scout-spot-
fires-2oo96o654LBrian Bennett, Drones Tested as Toolsfor Police and Firefighters, L.A. TIMES (Aug.
5, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2o12/aug/o5/nation/la-na-drones-testing-2120805 (discuss-
ing the testing of drones to determine their ability to find the source of a building fire).
21 Bennett, supra note 19.
22 Isolde RafteryAnticipating Domestic Boom, Colleges Rev Up Drone Piloting Programs, NBC
NEws (Jan. 29,2013), http://investigations.nbcnews.com/ news/2o3/oi/29/16726198-anticipating-
domestic-boom-colleges-rev-up-drone-piloting-programs.
23 Id
24 The US Army recently acquired a 1.8 gigapixel camera for drone use. This camera allows
drones to track people and vehicles across almost 65 miles from altitudes above 20,000 feet. US
Army Unveils 1.8 Gigapixel Camera Helicopter Drone, BBC NEWS (Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/technology-i635885I-
25 See, e.g., Draganflyer x6 Thermal Infrared Camera, DRAGANFLY INNOVATIONS INC., http://
www.draganfly.com/uav-helicopter/draganflyer-x6/features/flir-camera.php (last visited Oct. 20,
2013).
26 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Support Border Security, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
TODAY (July-Aug. 2004), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2oo4/Aug/other/aerialvehicles.
xml.
27 See Clay Dillow, Army Developing Drones that Can Recognize Your Face from a Distance,
POPSCI (Sept. 28, 2011, 5:01 PM), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2on-o9/army-
wants-drones-can-recognize-your-face-and-read-your-mind; see also Next Generation Identica-
tion, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints biometrics/
ngi (last visited Oct 20, 2013) (explaining the FBI's current si billion project to enhance its facial
recognition capabilities).
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1. Katz Standard.-The Fourth Amendment protects "[tihe right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures...."2 A qualifying search under the Amendment requires
that police first have probable cause or a warrant.29 Under the Exclusionary
Rule, any evidentiary fruits from an unreasonable search are barred from being
admitted against the wronged individual in court. 0 Conversely, if there has
been no search, no warrant is necessary.3' Therefore, the question of whether
police need a warrant to conduct drone surveillance turns on whether drone use
counts as a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The Supreme Court first considered this question in Olmstead v. United
States, holding that a Fourth Amendment search only occurs when police
physically invade a person or his property.32 The Court employed a purely
physical trespass test and, since the government had wiretapped the defendant's
home phone from a location off the property, it concluded that no search
implicating constitutional rights had occurred.33 The Court departed from this
property standard almost forty years later to focus on privacy interests.34
In Katz v. United States," the defendant was convicted of transmitting
gambling information through telephone lines after the FBI installed a
listening device on the outside of a public telephone booth. 6 Rejecting both
parties' arguments centering on whether a phone booth was a "constitutionally
protected area,"" the Court shifted its analysis from a physical property
standard to one involving a "reasonable expectation of privacy."" Recognizing
that the Constitution protects "people not places," 9 the Court looked not to the
nature of the area being searched but to the person's expectations." Although
the phone booth was visible, what the defendant sought to exclude when he
28 U.S. CONsT. amend IV.
29 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
30 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-94 (1914) (applying the Exclusionary Rule to
federal cases); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 56 (596i) (applying the Exclusionary Rule
to state cases).
31 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) ("'The Fourth Amendment simply does
not require the police traveling in the public airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to
observe what is visible to the naked eye.").
32 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
33 Id
34 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
35 Id
36 Id. at 348.
37 Id at 351. The parties were justified in focusing on the private or public nature of the "area"
in which the recording device was installed, given the Court's earlier holdings that a search was a
physical intrusion into a private area such as the home.
38 Id. at 359-




entered the phone booth was not the "intruding eye-but the uninvited ear."4 1
The Court drew the distinction that "[wihat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected."42
The most important development from Katz, however, came from Justice
Harlan's concurrence, in which he established a two-fold test that remains
the standard today. In order to invoke Fourth Amendment protection, Justice
Harlan determined that a person must have an actual, subjective expectation of
privacy and the expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize
as "reasonable."43 Departing from the physical intrusion focus of Olmstead, Katz
redefined Fourth Amendment protection to include intrusive searches that
are not physical, showing less concern for the method of invasion and more
concern for societal privacy norms."
Despite the shift in Katz to "people and not places," the Court in United
States v. Jones45 observed that a Fourth Amendment search occurs "at a
minimum" where "the Government obtains information by physically intruding
on a constitutionally protected area ... ."" The majority in Jones indicated that
Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy test was never meant to overrule the
property-based approach of Olmstead but instead to supplement it.4 7 This
raises the question: Where do individuals enjoy the most and the least Fourth
Amendment protection? Subsequent cases have contributed partial answers,
delineating zones of protection that may give insight into the likely treatment
of domestic drone surveillance under the current jurisprudence.
2. Defning the Zones of Privacy.-Kyllo v. United States solidified the home
as the zone afforded the greatest privacy protection by the Constitution. 48 In
addition to the Constitution's express protection against the government's
physical entry and search of the home, Kyllo extended this protection to certain
technologies used to pierce this zone of privacy.49 In Kyllo, government agents
employed thermal imagers to detect heat signals coming from the external walls
of the defendant's home, and used that information to conclude that there were
marijuana grow lamps inside.so The Court refused to allow technology to erode
41 Id. at 352.
42 Id. at 351.
43 Id. at 361 (HarlanJ., concurring).
44 Id. at 352-53 (majority opinion).
45 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
46 Id. at 951 n.3.
47 Id. at 947 ("The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, but no
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.").
48 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
49 Id at 34.
5o Id. at 29-30.
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the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, holding that "obtaining
by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area' constitutes a search-at least where (as
here) the technology in question is not in general public use."s' The home,
however, is not absolutely shielded from government surveillance; the "plain
view" doctrine, as noted by Justice Harlan in Katz, establishes that "objects,
activities, or statements [a person] exposes to the'plain view'of outsiders are not
'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited."52
'Ihus, in some instances, police may conduct warrantless searches of the inside
of a home using their natural senses." To qualify for this exception, the police
must be in a lawful vantage point when they conduct the surveillance outside the
home, and the incriminating nature of the evidence must be readily apparent.5 4
Outside of the confines of the home, the degree of an individual's Fourth
Amendment protection depends on whether the search occurs within the
"curtilage"or"open fields."" Curtilage refers to the area immediately surrounding
the home, which the Court has defined as "the area to which extends the
intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life ... ."'56 The Court has identified four factors in determining whether an
area is curtilage: how close the area is to the home, whether the area is fenced
in, how the area is used, and whether the area is shielded from observation
by passersby." Curtilage is generally given the same protection afforded the
home while open fields are given less protection.s In Oliver v. United States,"
the Court affirmed that Fourth Amendment protection did not extend to
open fields, which "do not provide the setting for those intimate activities
that the Amendment is intended to shelter from governmental interference
or surveillance."60 Differentiating between open fields and curtilage is an often
difficult task which has important implications for drone surveillance, as the
Court has permitted searches in both areas in the manned aerial surveillance
cases discussed infra.
51 Id. at 34.
52 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan,J., concurring).
53 See United States v. Hammett, 236 F 3 d 1054, ro61 (9 th Cir. 200) (holding police observa-
tion of marijuana plants through a crack in the house's siding a lawful search).
54 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,466 (1971).
55 See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (distinguishing between the doctrines of
curtilage and open fields).
56 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 18o (1984) (citation omitted).
57 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294,30 (1987).
58 Oliver, 466 U.S. at i8o.
59 466 U.S. 170.
60 Id. at 179-
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3. Manned Aerial Surveillance.-In a series of cases providing the closest
analogy to drones thus far, the Court considered the constitutionality of
manned aerial surveillance, and in each, held that the fly-over at issue was not
a prohibited Fourth Amendment search since the areas were open to public
view. In California v. Ciraolo,6" a police officer, based on an anonymous tip,
flew a winged aircraft at an altitude of 1000 feet and observed marijuana in a
suspect's backyard without first procuring a search warrant.62 The Court held
that because the policeman was in legally navigable airspace, he had a right
to be there and "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection." 63 Despite the area being fenced in,
the Court viewed the defendant's expectation of privacy as unreasonable since
any member of the public flying overhead could have glanced down and seen
the plants.'4 The Court underscored the fact that the plane was in navigable
airspace as defined by federal statute."s
Similarly, in Florida v. Riley, police observed marijuana growing in a
greenhouse in the defendant's backyard through the structure's partially open
roof while flying in a helicopter at 400 feet. 66 The Court ruled the search was
reasonable, relying again on the fact that the helicopter had a right to be in
the airspace and any member of the public flying in a helicopter over the
defendant's property could have observed the marijuana.6 1 The Court held the
defendant's expectation of privacy unreasonable since there was "nothing in
the record ... to suggest that helicopters flying at 400 feet are sufficiently rare
in this country ... ." 68 The Court seemed to reason that because the helicopter
did not interfere with the defendant's use of the curtilage and since there was
no undue noise, wind, dust, or threat of injury, the search was reasonable.6 1 In
her concurrence, Justice O'Connor criticized the plurality's decision as resting
"the scope of Fourth Amendment protection too heavily on compliance with
FAA regulations whose purpose is to promote air safety, not to protect [Fourth
Amendment rights]."o
Finally, in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States," the Court rejected a theory
of "industrial curtilage" when a government agency took aerial photographs of
a 2000-acre commercial plant.72 The Court concluded the open areas of the
61 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
62 Id. at 209.
63 Id. at 213 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,35 (1967)).
64 Id. at 213-14.
65 Id. at 213.
66 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 451 (1989).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 452.
70 Id. (O'Connor,J., concurring).
71 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
72 Id. at 239.
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industrial plant were more like open fields than intimate curtilage of the home
and that photographing the plant from navigable airspace was not a search."
4. Government Tracking.-Like the aerial surveillance cases, individuals have
reduced expectations of privacy from government tracking during their travel
in public places. This has allowed warrantless tracking of a vehicle's movements
on public streets. 7 4 In United States v. Knotts,75 the police tracked a vehicle's
movements solely on public streets using both visual surveillance and a
radio transmitter.7 6 The Court held that no Fourth Amendment search had
occurred because people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their movements on public streets.7 7 In contrast, in United States v. Karo,7
the police tracked a beeper they had placed in a container in the defendant's
possession while he was on public streets and in his home.79 Holding that the
monitoring of a beeper in a private residence violates the Fourth Amendment
rights of those with a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence, the
Court observed that the "[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of property that has been
withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy
interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment
oversight.""
Although government tracking of public movements is generally not
considered a search, if it is prolonged and pervasive, it might be. In 2012, in
United States v. Jones,"' the government attached a GPS tracking device to the
defendant's Jeep and tracked the vehicle's movement for twenty-eight days.82
The defendant was subsequently charged with drug trafficking conspiracy and
sought to suppress the evidence as fruits of an unreasonable search." The Court
declined to apply Katz's "reasonable expectation of privacy" test and instead
applied Olmsteads property-based approach, holding the Government's physical
intrusion on an "effect" (the vehicle) for the purpose of obtaining information
constituted a "search."8 4 The Court found "such a physical intrusion would have
been considered a'search'within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when
it was adopted.""
73 Id.
74 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
75 Id
76 Id. at 281.
77 Id. at 281-82.
78 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
79 Id. at 708.
so Id at 716.
81 United States v.Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
82 Id. at 948.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 949-50.
85 Id. at 949.
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In his concurrence, Justice Alito expressed concern that the majority's
opinion would be difficult to apply due to vast changes in trespass law since the
country's founding." In his view the majority's opinion was flawed, ignoring
what was really important-the use of a GPS for long-term tracking-and
left unanswered many questions incompatible with a property-based test. 7 For
instance, what if the government gained remote access to a vehicle's on-board
GPS? Although no physical trespass has occurred, would the search be lawful?"
Further, what if the police used aerial surveillance instead?89 justice Alito
suggested that the suspect's "reasonable expectations of privacy were violated
by the long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove,"" and
applying the Katz test would allow a more workable rule for searches involving
technology, making the element of physical intrusion unnecessary for finding
that a search occurred. Justice Alito also observed that "[i]n the pre-computer
age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory,
but practical" noting traditional surveillance for extended periods was "difficult
and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.""
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor elaborated on practical concerns as
they relate to privacy, noting that extensive GPS monitoring generates a precise
record of peoples' travel patterns revealing intimate details about their daily
lives such as "familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations."92
Taking this into account, she suggested a Katz approach under which she would
ask, "whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded
and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more
or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.""
Technological surveillance has become more intrusive in effect than traditional
surveillance, primarily because of the practical limitations that once restrained
extended monitoring. Thus, Justice Sotomayor warned that extended GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses violates expectations of privacy.94
The rationales expressed in the concurring opinions offer insight into "the
86 See id at 957 n.2 (Alito,J., concurring) (joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, & Kagan,JJ.) (noting
that a common law trespass for chattels, unlike today, did not require actual damage to the chattel
and that the car in this case did not sustain any damage).
87 See id at 961.
88 See id. at 962 ("Would the sending of a radio signal to active [a stolen vehicle detection
system] constitute a trespass to chattels? Trespass to chattels has traditionally required a physical
touching of the property.").
89 See id. at 961 ("If the police attach a GPS device to a car and use the device to follow the
car for even a brief time, under the Court's theory, the Fourth Amendment applies. But if the police
follow the same car for a much longer period using unmarked cars and aerial assistance, this track-
ing is not subject to any Fourth Amendment constraints.").
90 Id. at 958.
91 Id. at 963.
92 Id. at 955 (SotomayorJ., concurring).
93 Id. at 956.
94 Id. at 955-
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direction the Court might lead us in the light of technological advancements
and privacy concerns . . . ."9s Despite the direction of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, in light of current technology, individuals may be unprotected
from government drone surveillance.
II. WHY ARE DRONES A PRIVACY ISSUE?
A. Lack of Practical Safeguards
Drone technology presents a unique threat to privacy by eliminating
practical safeguards against Fourth Amendment searches. First, drones can be
substantially smaller than traditional aircrafts, making them practically invisible
at altitudes where traditional aircraft could be spotted from the ground."6 Second,
unlike traditional aircraft such as helicopters, many drones can operate almost
silently, allowing them to conduct surveillance virtually unnoticed.97 Third, as
one legal scholar notes: "[w]ith the ability to hover or circle in the sky for hours,
[drones] present a potential intrusion far more pervasive than the mere flyover
of a plane or helicopter."" As Justice Alito observed in Jones, constant long-
term surveillance without technology (such as GPS tracking) requires many
agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance, practically rendering
such surveillance impossible." Drone capabilities have even further opened
the doors to previously unknown levels of invasive government monitoring by
rendering it relatively easy and cheap.
Similarly, drone surveillance allows a depth of information collection
previously impossible. Like the Jones concurrences' concern with GPS
monitoring, drones allow the collection of a vast amount of intimate personal
information-travel patterns or shopping habits to name a few" to-but on a
much larger scale, and surveillance is not limited merely to an individual but all
people beneath the drone's all-seeing eye.
B. Is Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence Applicable to Drones?
The constitutionality of domestic drone surveillance may depend on the
context in which the surveillance takes place. Both the technology used and
95 United States v. Wilkerson, No. 11-027 Section "B"( 3), zoz U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8527, at *2 l.I
(E.D. La. Jan. 23, 2012) ("The competing rationales between the majority opinion and the concur-
ring ones could be insightful to the direction the Court might lead us in the light of technological
advancements and privacy concerns .... ").
96 Travis Dunlap, We've Got OurEyes on You: When Surveillance by UnmannedAircraft Systems
Constitutes a Fourth Amendment Search, 51 S.TEx. L. REV. I73, 20I (2009).
97 Id
98 Id.
99 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito,J., concurring) (joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, & Kagan,JJ.).
oo Id. at 955-56 (SotomayorJ., concurring); see id.
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the location of the surveillance may factor into the Fourth Amendment's
application to drone surveillance.
1. Location ofSearch.-Previous Fourth Amendment jurisprudence established
zones of privacy around the home, each with distinguishing levels of protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Based on existing case law, it is
reasonable to assume that drone surveillance of an individual in his home-the
area afforded greatest privacy protection under the Constitution-would be
unlawful. Specifically, in Kyllo, the Court considered the police's use of thermal
technology to gain information about the inside of an individual's home.'
Drones can now be equipped with similar technology and will soon be able to
see through walls and ceilings.' 02 Under the Kyllo standard, warrantless searches
aided by technologies not in general public use should not pass muster under
the Fourth Amendment. While the more powerful equipment-such as facial
recognition technology and certain high-powered cameras-might fail this
test, thermal imaging technology like that used in Kyllo is more available to
the general public today than it was when Kyllo was decided. 03 Therefore, an
important unanswered question concerning the Kyllo standard is what is meant
by technology "not in general public use."To be in "general public use,"does the
technology have to be used by a majority of the public, or is it enough that the
technology is readily available and affordable to the public? It is only a matter
of time before technology like facial recognition and high-powered cameras
are widely used by the public.'04 What seems clear, however, is that the use
of low-powered cameras and other unsophisticated technology, which are in
general use, to view people and objects in their home while in plain view would
probably be constitutional under the Kyllo standard, because an officer does not
have to "shield his eyes" from illegal activity in plain view.I
It is unclear whether the same protection against surveillance afforded to
the home would be extended to areas immediately surrounding the home-
say, a deck, pool, or garden. 06 Although the Court has generally given the
1o Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001).
102 RICHARD M. THOMPSON 11, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4 27 0, DRONES IN DOMESTIC
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
13 (2053), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R 4 27oi.pdf.
103 See, e.g., Draganflyer x6, supra note 25.
104 See Andy Bloxham, Facial Recognition Software to Go Public, THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. z2,
2010, 3:55 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/79585n//Facial-recognition-soft-
ware-to-go-public.html.
105 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
106 See Paul McBride, Beyond Orwell: 7heApplication of UnmannedAircraft Systems in Domestic
Surveillance Operations, 74 J. AIR. L. & COM. 627, 655-56 (2009) ("While framing the question pre-
sented in Kyllo, Justice Scalia reiterated that Dow Chemical, which upheld the constitutionality of
high-resolution aerial photography of an industrial complex, was 'not an area immediately adjacent
to a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened.'This implies that although the
curtilage does not benefit from the absolute protection afforded to the interior of the home, there
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same protection to curtilage as the home itself, it has found manned aerial
surveillance of curtilage outside the scope of Fourth Amendment protection.
The manned aerial surveillance cases, most comparable to drone surveillance,
can therefore give insight into the legality of drone surveillance under the
Fourth Amendment. There are three main questions to consider when analyzing
aerial surveillance of curtilage: First, was the surveillance conducted in airspace
where the aircraft had a legal right to be under FAA regulations? Second, was
the aircraft's flight at that particular altitude sufficiently rare, so as to violate
reasonable expectations of privacy? Third, did the surveillance interfere with
the defendant's use of the property-for example, by creating noise, wind, or
dust?o Under the first and third factors, it seems likely that drone surveillance
of curtilage would not warrant Fourth Amendment protection since drones
will likely be in FAA approved airspace and there "already are UAVs that do
not make detectable noise or wind even at nearly five feet."os As to the second
factor, with only 327 licenses issued for use in U.S. airspace as of February
2013,10' drone surveillance might be sufficiently rare, so that such surveillance
would violate an individual's reasonable expectations of privacy. But in several
years, drones might be prevalent enough to pass Katz reasonableness standards.
So called "open fields" have traditionally been excluded from Fourth
Amendment protection from searches because they "do not provide the setting
for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from
government interference or surveillance."no Therefore, it is unlikely drone
surveillance conducted in open fields would violate the Fourth Amendment.
However, depending on the pervasiveness of the surveillance, citizens worried
about prolonged government tracking of their activities in public places might
find solace if in the future the Court follows the logic of the Jones majority
discussed infra.
2. Technology Used.-In addition to the location of a search, the technology used
in a search might factor into a court's determination of the constitutionality
of drone surveillance. In Dow, the Court seemingly found aerial surveillance
with unsophisticated cameras lawful under the Fourth Amendment."' Noting
that the device used was a standard mapmaking camera, and although it gave
the government more information than could have been seen with the naked
eye, the Court held that the camera did not reveal intimate activities to a level
is a close relationship between the two, and that technology directed at the home and its curtilage
will be subjected to a more skeptical analysis than would be applied in a case involving open fields
or industrial areas.") (footnote omitted).
107 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,451-52 (1989).
1o8 See Roberts, supra note 19, at So8 (footnote omitted).
109 Fact Sheet - Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), FED. AVIATION ADmIN. (Feb. 19, 2053),
http://www.faa.gov/news/fact-sheets/news story.cfm?newsId=4153.
io Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,179 (1984).
i1u Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986).
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necessary to warrant constitutional protection.'12 It opined that if the target was
on private property, the equipment highly sophisticated and not in public use,
the result might be different."'
Departing from the "results-based" methodology of Katz, which focused
on individual privacy expectations despite the technological method used,
Dow seemed to return to the technology-based approach of earlier cases.
This suggests that the Court will look to the type of technology employed in
drone surveillance to determine whether a Fourth Amendment violation has
occurred.1 4 Dow requires that constitutional searches be enhanced only by
technology in general public use, similar to the approach in Kyllo. 5 This would
suggest that for now, facial recognition technology, license place scanners, and
high-powered cameras used in conjunction with drone surveillance might be
found unconstitutional.
However, considering the limiting language of Dow and Kyllo, drone
surveillance may soon fall outside the realm of protection offered by current
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as these technologies and drones themselves
become available to and used by the general public. Current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, with its focus on the reasonable privacy expectations of society,
might not be effective to protect society from drone surveillance as technological
advances chip away at privacy norms. The Court seems aware of this emerging
trend, as Justice Alito observed, joined by three other justices, in his United
States v. Jones concurrence:
[T]he Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable
person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. But
technology can change those expectations. Dramatic technological change
may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may
ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes. New technology
may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and
many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does
not welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they
may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable."'6
Justice Alito hints at the best fix for this problem: "In circumstances involving
dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be
legislative.""'
112 Id. at 238.
113 Id.
114 See Roberts, supra note 19, at 514-15-
115 Compare Kyllo v. United States, 33 U.S. 27,34 (2001) ("We think that obtaining by sense-
enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise
have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area' constitutes a
search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.") (citation
omitted), with Dow, 476 U.S. at 238 ("It may well be, as the Government concedes, that surveillance
of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to
the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.")
n16 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
117 Id. at 964.
[ Vol. 102174
2013- 20141 WATCHING THE WATCHMENT: DRONE PRIVACY
C. Proposed Legislative Solutions Are Inadequate
Several proposed bills are currently making their way through Congress, but
perhaps the most comprehensive and promising is the Drone Aircraft Privacy
and Transparency Act of 2013 (DAPTA), introduced by Congressman Edward
J. Markey on March 19, 2013.1s DAPTA prescribes, among other things, the
following:
1) The Secretary ofTransportation shall establish procedures
to integrate drones in the U.S. airspace in compliance with
privacy principles."1
2) Applicants for drone operation licenses shall submit a
"data collection statement" which includes the following
information:
a) who will be operating the drone
b) specific locations the drone will be used
c) maximum time period of each flight
d) if data will be collected about individuals and if so,
how data will be used, how long it will be retained, how
it will be disposed of, and if and on what conditions it
will be sold.
e) establish a system where citizens may inquire about
violations, file complaints, and have data disposed of.'20
3) Applicants who are, or affiliated with, a law enforcement
agency must also file a "data minimization statement" which
includes:
a) minimize collection of data unrelated to warranted
searches
b) require destruction of above info
c) establish procedures of destruction
d) audit procedures by applying agency to enforce
compliance with statement.12'
4) FAA shall publish a website containing all drone licenses,
and information relevant to when, where, and how long
118 Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 2868, 113 th Cong. (203). DAP-
TA was reintroduced without substantive change by Congressman Peter Welch in the ist Session
of the I13th Congress, July 30, 2013-
119 Id. § 338.
120 Id. § 33 9 (b).
121 Id. § 339(c).
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drones will be operated.122
5) A warrant for government drone service shall be required,
except when threats of imminent death, serious injury, or
terrorist attack are present. 123
6) Use of unlawful evidence in courts shall be prohibited. 12 4
7) The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will enforce
regulations and can enact regulations to aid in enforcement.125
8) There shall be available civil and private rights of action
for violations of the act, including injunction and damages.' 26
9) The Federal Aviation Administration shall have the power
to revoke a drone operator's license for violations of the act.127
Disconcertingly, DAPTA is overly broad in certain areas and vague in
others. For DAPTA to be an effective safeguard against the diminishment of
privacy due to domestic drone operation, it must be as complete and forward-
looking as possible to minimize privacy violations. Several parts of DAPTA
are not sufficiently thorough and prospective. For instance, the Act does not
establish a uniform process for oversight and organization because it delegates
the responsibility to would-be operators, thus dulling the Act's sharpest weapon
in defense of privacy.' In another provision, DAPTA requires the FAA to post
approved drone operation licenses on its website within ninety days if granted
before the Acts enactment and "as soon as practicable" if granted after.' 9 The
vague wording of this section creates confusion in the law and opens the door
to privacy violations. The purpose of posting approved drone operators and
schedules to the public is transparency but this goal is pointless if rights have
been irrevocably violated through confusion or disorganization.
DAPTA is a big step in the right direction towards ensuring privacy
protections in the days of drone surveillance. However, it is incomplete because
it overlooks several important areas of regulation that would ensure privacy
protections, as discussed in the next section. It establishes privacy safeguards but
fails to ensure proper application and enforcement. Amendments to DAPTA
are necessary to ensure a solid foundation that will withstand domestic drone
122 Id. § 340.
123 Id. § 34 1(a)-(b).
124 Id § 34 1(b)(6).
125 Id § 4 (b)(2).
126 Id. § 4(c)(I), (d)(i).
127 Id § 4(f).
128 Id § 339(C)(2).
129 Id § 34 0(b)(I}-(2).
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use and other technological advancements that chip away at privacy.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH: BALANCING PRIVACY CONCERNS WITH INDUSTRY
GROWTH THROUGH ONGOING AUDIT AND REPORTING PROCEDURES
The rapid expansion ofdrone technology and use renders Fourth Amendment
privacy safeguards inadequate, necessitating federal legislative action. Congress
has previously passed preemptive legislation to address potential privacy issues
in the face of technological advances.o If proper privacy protections are not in
place when the drone boom occurs, the legislature may not be able to respond
fast enough to address infractions and civil rights concerns. If Congress does
not act, privacy violations could occur without redress, privacy norms could
be diminished, and society could become complacent. As one scholar noted,
now is the time to establish a proper regulatory framework to address privacy
concerns associated with domestic drone use.'
Additionally, such legislation might be a sufficient safeguard to appease
the privacy advocates and the general public alike, so that the expansion of
drone technology and the economic benefits associated with it can move
forward unhindered. Currently, drone industry experts worry that legislative
intervention will delay or possibly stifle economic and technological growth
in the U.S. drone industry,'32 citing such privacy concerns as "a distraction."33
Unless the industry gets serious about privacy, however, federal legislation
might be the only way for industry experts and privacy enthusiasts to find
common ground.
Some have argued for state and local, rather than federal, regulation of
130 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended in scattered sections of18 U.S.C.§§ 2701-2712 (2002)); Jason Koebler, Drone
Moans. PrivacyAdvocates Urge Drone Limits 'Before it's Too Late', U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 15,
2003), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2o3/oL/is/drone-moans [hereinafter Koebler, Drone
Moans] (statement of Orin Kerr) ("With the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,
Congress was protecting people's emails before most people knew what email was.").
131 Ben Wolfgang, Laws Urged to Curb Snooping by Drones, WAsH. TIMES (Jan. I5, 2003),
http://p.washingtontimes.com/news/20z3/jan/i5/experts-coming-drone-world-current-law-in-
adequate/ (statement of Orin Kerr) ("This is a natural space for Congress to step in and say that we
have a new technology, and we're worried about its privacy implications. Ultimately, we don't have
to accept new technologies and let them go and see how they work. We can try and regulate the
privacy implications at the outset."). In fact, one scholar believes that in order to realize the ultimate
potential benefits of domestic drones, Congress needs to address the privacy issues initially to ap-
pease public concern and create an atmosphere receptive to drone innovation and application. See
Ryan Calo, As Drone Tecbnology Advances, Who is Responsible?, GLOBALPOST RIGHTS BLOG (Oct.
16, 2012, 5:38 PM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/rights/drone-technol-
ogy-privacy-liability-responsibility.
132 Jason Koebler, Drone Industry: Privacy 'Distractions' Could Have Major Economic Impacts,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 03, 2003), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2o03/o3/I3/
drone-industry-privacy-distractions--could-have-major-economic-impacts [hereinafter Koebler,
Drone Industry]; see also Anderson, supra note 6 (discussing the commercial potential of drones).
133 Koebler, Drone Industry, supra note 132.
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drones, 13 4 opining these governmental bodies are better equipped to handle
and react to the nuances of an emerging technology, but recent state drone
legislation failures suggest otherwise. 3 s Recently, many state drone regulation
bills have been struck down as legislators vie to secure their states as FAA
drone-testing sites. It is estimated that within the next few years domestic
drone use will create over 70,000 jobs and generate $82 billion."' One of the
factors considered by the FAA when choosing test sites is the presence of
"drone-restrictive" laws and state legislators have been hesitant to jeopardize
their states' chances at being selected.' 7 After a North Dakota bill that would
have banned police from warrantless use of drones was struck down, a state
senator remarked, "Now that we've defeated that bill in the Senate, it sends
a clear message to the FAA that North Dakota's open for business . "13
Attitudes and remarks like this suggest that state and local governments cannot
be counted on to protect privacy interests in the face of competing economic
opportunity. Baseline federal privacy safeguards would sufficiently protect
privacy interests and still allow for technological and economic growth in the
drone industry.
IV. SPECIFIC REGULATORY RECOMMENDATIONS
Future federal regulation should be written to provide baseline privacy
protections against government drone usage without being over-inclusive so as
to stifle industry growth and its attendant economic benefits. Most important
to this legislation are provisions that provide for transparency between the
government operator and the public. Proposed solutions include operators
supplying updated statements about the nature of the data being collected (e.g.,
purpose of surveillance, duration of surveillance, incidental data collected), a
general statement of when and where such surveillance data will be collected,
and this data subsequently being published to a website for public notice and
review. Almost just as important is oversight through external audit procedures,
which would work as a check on malfeasance. DAPTA includes several of the
134 See Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry, 4
CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 57, 57 (203), http://www.californialawreview.org/assets/circuit/Kamin-
ski-4..37.pdf (arguing standards for civilian drone use would be best established through a trial and
error process by state governments, which could more effectively respond to drone technological
advancements and capabilities than an overbroad blanket federal regulation); see also Liz Goodwin,
Privacy a Looming Issue as Drone Regulation Loosens, YAHOO NEWS (May 30, 2013,7:14 AM), hqWp1l
news.yahoo.com/blogs/ticket/privacy-looming--issue-drone-regulation-loosens-izI425343.html.
135 See Sean McElwee, States "Race to the Bottom" on Drone Privacy, MODERATE VOICE (May 7,
2013), http://themoderatevoice.com/l8ii75/states-race-to-the-bottom-on-drone-privacy/.
136 DARRYL JENKINS & BIJAN VASIGH, Ass'N FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE Sys. INT'L, THE Eco-
NOMIC IMPACT OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS INTEGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3-4
(zoz3), available at http://gzprod.files.wordpress.com/2or3/03/econ report fu112.pdf.
137 Luckerson, supra note 5.
138 Id.
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safeguards necessary in any legislation to protect privacy but could be improved
to address several shortcomings. With the following improvements, DAPTA
could stand as a solid legislative framework to protect privacy standards and
still allow for industry growth.
First and foremost, DAPTA is virtually silent on the issue of oversight in its
implementation. For instance, DAPTA requires would-be drone operators to
submit data collection and minimization statements outlining when, where, and
how data will be collected; when and how long data will be retained; and how
data will be disposed of, but fails to establish a reliable process for monitoring
if operators are complying with these statements.' 9 Though DAPTA does
outline how the public can request information regarding the operator's drone
usage, this process is not much better than the cumbersome one established by
the Freedom of Information Act that currently controls drone transparency.140
Continuing oversight by an objective agency is necessary to ensure DAPTA
is being followed and standards are not being relaxed. Public monitoring may
fail as an effective check on misfeasance and/or malfeasance-if the disclosure
process is too burdensome or inconvenient, many citizens might forgo even
trying to request information from the operators, weakening the disclosure
process as an oversight tool.141 In addition, and perhaps more problematic, the
clandestine nature of drone technology makes it difficult for citizens to monitor
surveillance violations. It is impossible to complain about something that one is
not aware is happening. 42
DAPTA should be amended to require operators to submit updates to
report on their drone operations process. These reports should detail when
information was collected, where it was collected, and when and how the
139 See Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2053, H.R. 2868, ss3 th Cong. § 339(c)
(2) (2013) (leaving audit procedures be adopted by the operating agency, but failing to proscribe
the necessary regularity of such procedures or to consider potential conflicts of interest present in
deferring audit procedures to the operating agency). Delegating the establishment of audit pro-
cedures to a sole governing agency would create uniformity, predictability, and reliability in audit
procedures.
140 See Press Release, Congressman Ed Markey, Markey, Barton: Privacy Protections, Trans-
parency a "Blind Spot"in FAA Oversight of Non-Military Domestic Drones (Nov. 29, 2012), avail-
able at http://votesmart.org/public-statement/756o8/markey-barton-privacy-protections-trans-
parency-a-blind-spot-in-faa-oversight-of-non-military-domestic-drones#.Uh6DIGSGi8N.
141 Though DAPTA prescribes that operators provide contact information citizens can use
to confirm "personally identifiable data" concerning them that has been collected, it fails to outline
what constitutes a proper response time once a request for confirmation has been made. Drone
Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 20z3, H.R. 2862, ss3th Cong. § 3 39 (b)( 7) (2013). Similarly,
DAPTA allows for an individual to obtain by request such data collected, if any, through a "reason-
able process" and that such data be distributed in a "timely" manner but fails to prescribe what is
a "reasonable process" and what constitutes a "timely" dispersal. Id. at § 33 9 (b)(8). This imprecision
could be problematic considering DAPTA has a two-year statute of limitations for private rights
of action. Id. at § 4 (d)(4 ).




information was used and disposed of. This information should then be posted
to the FAA (or other appropriate agency) website for public viewing. Also,
the designated oversight agency should have to compile a report detailing
the information gathering and disposal procedures of operators and submit
such report yearly to Congress to ensure ongoing objective oversight.'43 Such
monitoring requirements are necessary if legislative privacy safeguards are to be
effective, as a recent report indicates.'"
Second, while the FTC is prescribed to enforce DAPTA,'145 other agencies,
or even a wholly distinct agency, might be better equipped to monitor and
ensure DAPTA compliance. As an already overburdened agency, the FTC
might not be able to devote appropriate time and resources to monitoring
DAPTA compliance in the face of an exponentially increasing amount of
drone operators. Additionally, the FTC is not in the best position to enforce
DAPTA because it lacks control as only a piece of DAPTAs implementation
machinery, which compartmentalizes responsibility among various agencies
and parties. For instance, under DAPTA, the Secretary of Transportation is
in charge of rulemaking and approval of drone operation applications,'" the
FAA is in charge of disclosure of approved licenses,147 and the FTC is in charge
of compliance.148 Another possibility is appointing the FAA to monitor and
enforce DAPTA, since it is already tasked with publishing a list of operators
approved by the Secretary ofTransportation with their respective data collection
and minimization statements on the FAA website.149
Third, as part of ongoing oversight, DAPTA should require random
external program audits of drone operators in accordance with government
auditing standards.s 0 Random audits would discourage malfeasance and verify
the accuracy of operators' data collection and minimizations statements.''
While the above proposals (requiring operator reports and creating a workable
administrative and oversight system) would promote transparency between
143 Congress requires a similar reporting standard of the Justice Department in its use of pen
register and trap and trace order devices under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986. See Naomi Gilens, New Justice Department Documents Show Huge Increase in Warrantless Elec-
tronic Surveillance, ACLU FREE FUTURE BLOG (Sept. 27, 2012, 1:32 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/
national-security-technology-and-liberty/new-justice-department-documents-show-huge-in-
crease.
144 Cf id. (discussing the Justice Department's repeated failures to comply with reporting
requirements mandated under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and how these
failures render privacy safeguards ineffective).
145 H.R. 2868 § 4 (b).
146 Id §§ 338-339-
147 Id § 340(a).
148 Id § 4(b).
149 Id § 340(a).
150 U.S. Gov'T AcCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-I2- 3 3 iG, GOVERNMENT AUDITING STAN-
DARDS I7-18 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/59o/58728i.pdf.
151 See id.
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the operators and the public, auditing would "provide a direct link between
transparency and the credibility of the public sector entity."12 Auditing ensures
all of the information disclosed to the public about drone operational activities
is honest and complete.'s For example, if an operator reports that information
gathered through a particular surveillance operation was destroyed on a specific
date, the operator is aware that if audited, and his information does not correlate,
he might face a lawsuit and forfeiture of his license. The persistent possibility
of an audit encourages compliance with statutes and regulations even if U.S.
residents become complacent due to changes in privacy norms.'54
Fourth, while DAPTA requires disclosure of the "specific locations in which
the unmanned aircraft system will operate,"'s it fails to account for the fact that
operators inevitably change surveillance plans. DAPTA assumes the operators'
comprehensive understanding of their surveillance plans when they apply for a
license.Therefore, the supposed "transparency" of the licensing process and data
collection statement requirements is based on information that could change.
DAPTA should be amended to require operators to supplement their data
collection statements, which would detail any changes to drone deployment
locations and times. The FAA should then post the changes to its website
within a reasonable time. In order to protect fundamental principles of privacy,
oversight must keep pace with fast growing technologies that challenge privacy.
CONCLUSION
Growth in the market for government and commercial drone use could result
in worldwide expenditures of $89.1 billion over the next decade.15 6 For better
or for worse, drones will soon be everywhere."' Current law is unprepared to
protect Americans'privacy from what will be a drone's ever-watchful "eye in the
sky." However, a proper balance must be struck between privacy concerns and
stifling growth and technological advancement in a fledgling drone industry.
Federal legislation could offer a solution, and an amended DAPTA could
provide a decent model. In order for us to realize the full potential of drones we
must address privacy issues right from the start.' If Congress allays concerns
152 INST. OF INTERNAL AUDITORS, SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: THE ROLE OF AUDITING IN
PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE II (2d ed. 2012), https://na.theiia.org/standards-guidance/Pub-
lic%zoDocuments/Public Sector Governancei.3pdf.
153 See id.
154 See id. at I5.
155 H.R. 868 § 3 39 (b)(2).
i56 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-I2- 9 81, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS:
MEASURING PROGRESS AND ADDRESSING POTENTIAL PRIVACY CONCERNS WOULD FACILITATE
INTEGRATION INTO THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 2 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/
assets/65o/648348.pdf (citing TEAL GRP. CORP., WORLD UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE SYSTEMS
(2012)).
157 See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 4.
158 Calo, supra note 131.
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before there is a problem, the drone boom will be met by a social and political
climate more receptive to drones and their potential for positive results. The
time to address drone privacy is now. "[T]he technologies are still visible. In
10 years, they'll be small, they'll be everywhere, it'll be too late.""' As the law
stands now, citizens are left asking themselves "who watch the watchmen?"'
159 Koebler, Drone Moans, supra note 130 (statement of Bruce Schneier).
160 The Latin phrase quis custodiet ipsos custodes?, "who will keep the keepers themselves?," is
also sometimes translated as in the text. Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?, MERRIAM WEBSTER,http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/quis%2ocustodiet%20ipsos%2ocustodes (last visited Oct.
22, 200.
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